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Abstract 
Using a complete set of the SEC filing information on hedge funds (Form ADV) and the 
TASS data, we develop a quantitative model called the ω-Score to measure hedge fund 
operational risk. The ω-Score is related to conflict of interest issues, concentrated 
ownership, and reduced leverage in the ADV data. With a statistical methodology, we 
further relate the ω-Score to readily available information such as fund performance, 
volatility, size, age, and fee structures. Finally, we demonstrate that this risk score can be 
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  The hedge fund industry has experienced tremendous growth in the past decade. It 
is estimated that there are about 9,000 hedge funds worldwide with more than $1.8 
trillion under management, compared with only $39 billion in 1990. In particular, 
institutional investors are increasingly involved in investing hedge funds. For example, as 
of May 2006, the Massachusetts Pension Reserves Investment Management, Harvard 
University, and MIT have invested $4.0 billion, $3.1 billion, and $2.0 billion in hedge 
funds, respectively.2 
 However, the hedge fund industry is also known for its high attrition rate. 
Selecting a successful manager could be very challenging. In a white Paper by Capco, the 
authors estimate that half of the failed funds are due to operational risk.3 According to the 
International Association of Financial Engineers, operational risk is defined as “losses 
caused by problems with people, processes, technology, or external events.”4 More 
specifically, these include the risks of failure in the internal operational, control and 
accounting systems, failure of the compliance and internal audit systems and failure of 
employee fraud and misconduct. For example, losses due to misrepresentation (e.g., 
Sentinel Management Group, Wood River Capital Management, and International 
Management Associates) and failures due to management fraud (e.g., Bayou, Tradewinds 
International, Groundswell Capital, and KL Financial Group) can all be thought of as 
operational risk events.  
 The increasing demand for hedge funds together with potential failures due to 
operational risk impose a necessary operational due diligence process for selecting high 
quality managers, as commonly practiced by many prudent investors before their 
investments.  In recent research, Brown, Fraser, and Liang (2007) argue that effective due 
diligence is a source for hedge funds alpha.  They find that large funds of funds have the 
                                                            
2 Christine Williamson, “Investors say: Supersize it. More than 30 U.S. institutions invest $1 billion or 
more each”, Pensions & Investment, May 1, 2006. 
3 See “Understanding and Mitigating Operational Risk in Hedge Fund Investments”, a Capco White Paper, 
March, 2003. 
4 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FINANCIAL ENGINEERS, Report of the Operational Risk 
Committee: Evaluating Operational Risk Controls, CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS ON THE TOPIC 
OF: “How should firms determine the effectiveness of their operational risk controls?”, November 2001, 
www.iafe.org. 
 1
capability of absorbing the fixed costs associated with due diligence. The AIMA has 
developed a comprehensive questionnaire for hedge fund due diligence with detailed 
questions ranging from management, strategy, risk, to service providers.5 Due diligence 
performed by investing institutions is often conducted to the extent of a background 
check, an on-site office visit, manager interviews, automated legal alert systems on fund 
personnel activities, in addition to review of publicly available information. Although due 
diligence is intensively conducted in the hedge fund industry, the current practice is 
mostly  focused at the qualitative level instead of the quantitative level. This is because 
assessing operational risk necessarily relies upon intangible variables such as historical 
manager behavior and human factors relating to unethical or illegal acts. However, as the 
number of funds increases, and the fixed cost of evaluating them remains constant,    
there is  for a need for numerical scoring models in the spirit of   Altman’s z-Score model 
(1968) for bankruptcy.  While a quantitative model can never fully replace human 
judgement, and the processing of “soft information” can help prioritize the due diligence 
process.  Indeed, with the increasing flow of available information about managers, a 
reliable model is essential to reduce the dimensionality of the due-diligence process in 
order to better assess the operational risk exposure.  
 In this paper, starting from hedge fund filings with the SEC (Form ADV), we 
investigate the operational risk issue in depth for the industry. Form ADV is potentially 
relevant to the operational risk issue, as one of the purposes of hedge fund disclosure, 
according to the SEC is “keeping unfit persons from using hedge funds to perpetrate 
fraud.”6 Thus, the SEC devised a set of questions intended to uncover past violations by 
the investment adviser, and to elucidate condition that might leave clients vulnerable to 
future fraud or operational failure. Per the SEC requirement, major hedge funds based in 
the U.S. with more than 14 clients, assets of at least $25 million and a lockup period less 
than two years, as well as any internationally based fund with at least 14 U.S. based 
investors, filed Form ADV with the SEC by February 1, 2006.  While some advisers 
chose not to comply with this regulation, anticipating a future challenge, the vast majority 
filed as per the SEC requirement. However, on June 23, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
                                                            
5 See http://www.fortitudecapital.com/docs/dd/aima_questionnaire.pdf. 
6 See http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/ia-2333.htm 
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for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the rule changes that had required many 
newly-registered hedge fund managers to register as investment advisers under the 1940 
Investment Advisers Act. Since then, some hedge funds have started to deregister their 
filings. Because our ADV data was downloaded before June 2006, the data provides the 
only relatively complete database on hedge fund registration for studying operational 
risk. 
 In our analysis of these filings, we find that operational risk, as measured by past 
legal or regulatory problems incurred by investment advisers or fund managers, is 
strongly related to ADV variables such as conflict of interest, ownership, and leverage. 
Hence, it is possible to develop an instrument for assessment of operational risk based on 
the ADV data. Given that Form ADV filings are limited going forward and hence, 
complete information on operational risk co-factors may not be observable in the future, 
alternative models based on available information are warranted.    In this article, we use 
variables in the Lipper-TASS database to develop this instrument. Through a statistical 
mapping technology, we are able to link the ADV variables with the TASS variables, 
then we use the Lipper-TASS variables to develop a risk instrument we call the ω-Score, 
which is a function of fund performance, volatility, fund age and size, and fee structure.  
 This paper is related to Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2007).  In that 
work we used the ω-Score to explore the question of whether Form ADV information 
was redundant in the investment marketplace.  In this paper we turn to the crucial 
question of whether the ω-Score can be used to predict fund failure in the future. The 
main contribution of this paper is a scoring model for detecting operational risk in the 
hedge fund industry. While we anticipate that more sophisticated models can be 
developed in the future, this paper demonstrates the feasibility of scoring funds according 
to their potential for operational risk events.  
Data 
We use data from two different sources. The first is the well known Lipper-TASS 
database. In order to capture the changes of fund characteristic data over time and back 
test our model  we have nine different versions of the data covering the period from 
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1998-2006.  We use the February, 2006 TASS data to match management companies 
with the SEC Form ADV filings. The February, 2006 TASS database contains 4,019 live 
hedge funds and 2,491 defunct hedge funds. It also includes the management company 
information. The second source of data is the Form ADV data from the SEC investment 
adviser website.7 Each Form ADV contains information on an investment adviser. The 
filing consists of 12 items and at least three schedules.8 Items 1 through 6 contain 
descriptive information on the firm, including its address, structure, number of employees 
in various positions and a breakdown of investor types. Items 7 and 8 look at potential 
conflicts of interest of the firm. Item 9 examines the custody of various assets while Item 
10 looks at the control persons of the firm. Item 12 provides information to allow the 
SEC to examine the effect of the regulation on small businesses.  
Item 11 is of particular interest to us as it identifies any “problems” that the 
management or related advisory affiliates have, including felonies, investment-related 
misdemeanors or any agency, SEC, CFTC, or self-regulatory issues. If the firm answers 
yes to any of the questions on Item 11, it must also file a Disclosure Reporting Page, 
which expands on the problem identified in Item 11. Schedule A includes the direct 
owners and executive officers of the firm, Schedule B lists the indirect owners of the firm 
and Schedule D includes a list of other business locations, other locations of records, 
previously non-listed control persons and a list of the limited partnerships in which the 
firm participates. 
We downloaded Form ADV data directly from the SEC website.9 To match Form 
ADV’s to hedge fund companies, we implemented a two-phase search. First, we searched 
for the common management company listed for each fund.10 If that search was 
unsuccessful, we then searched for any unique names that appeared in the fund’s name. 
In a majority of cases, the company was identified using just the management company 
                                                            
7 See http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/IapdMain/iapd_SiteMap.aspx, the SEC investment 
adviser website. 
8 There are additional forms if the company has a “problem” as defined later in the paper or if the company 
also filed with a state agency. 
9 Data were downloaded in March and April 2006. It is important to note the ADVs are dynamic in that the 
SEC will update the information on the investment adviser website as soon as new information is available. 
Thus, the data downloaded in the future will not match exactly the data used in this study. 
10 A few of the funds also listed an investment adviser with a different name than the management 
company. We also included these companies in our search if the management company was not located. 
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information.11 Note that, since the requirement to register began on February 1, 2006, our 
searches only encompassed the live database. To insure matches, one fund listed in the 
TASS dataset had to be matched to a fund listed on Form ADV.12 
Following the above procedure, we successfully identified 879 management 
companies out of 1,697 (or 51.8%) listed in TASS. These management companies 
represent 2,299 (57.2%) of the 4,019 live funds in the live TASS database. The 
unmatched TASS funds include funds with less than the $25 million in assets (22% of 
unmatched funds), funds with lockups longer than two years (2%), and foreign 
companies with fewer than 14 U.S. investors (73%).13 
Empirical Results 
 Defining “Problem Funds” and “Non-Problem Funds”. In order to assess 
operational risk, we need to define the term. We start by classifying funds as “problem” 
funds and “non-problem” funds in the ADV data.   
Problem funds are those whose management companies answered yes to any of 
the questions on Item 11 in Form ADV while non-problem funds answered no to all 
questions on Item 11. Problems covered on Item 11 include any past felony or financial 
related misdemeanor changes or convictions. The form also includes questions 
concerning any SEC, CFTC, federal or state agency or other regulatory disciplinary 
action as well as civil lawsuits. Of the 2,299 funds in our sample, 368 (or 16%) have 
management firms that answered yes to at least one question on Item 11.14 The 
percentage of funds with problems is not being driven by only a few management 
companies; of the 879 management companies, 126 companies, or 14.3%, answered yes 
to a question on Item 11. 
                                                            
11 We did not explicitly keep track of this breakdown, but estimate that fewer than 15% of all matches were 
made using the fund name. 
12 Some of the ADV filings did not list any funds. In these cases, the name and address of the ADV was 
used to verify a match. 
13 As of the beginning of April 2006, we were unable to match around 100 management companies in 
TASS with U.S. addresses and over $25 million in assets. There are a variety of reasons for these 
companies not to be registered, including a lockup period change, a reduction in assets or an error in the 
TASS database. 
14 These results were also run excluding fund-of-funds as their structure is different than hedge funds. 
There are no material differences between those results and the reported results. 
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Table 1: Performance Statistics and Fund/Manager Characteristics 
 of “Problem” and “Non-Problem” Funds 
 “Problem” Funds  “Non-Problem” Funds    
 N Mean Median N Mean Median Diff p-value 
Avg Return 310 0.77 0.68 1603 0.91 0.79 -0.14 0.00** 
Std Dev 308 2.50 1.66 1568 2.71 2.02 -0.21 0.15 
1st order Auto Corr 283 0.12 0.14 1441 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.60 
Sharpe Ratio 308 0.28 0.25 1568 0.36 0.26 -0.08 0.01* 
AUM ($mm) 334 217.32 59.18 1653 179.96 54.00 37.36 0.20 
Age (Years) 367 5.60 4.50 1929 4.96 3.83 0.64 0.01** 
Min Investment 367 0.96 0.50 1926 1.28 0.50 -0.32 0.33 
Management Fee (%) 367 1.37 1.50 1929 1.38 1.50 -0.01 0.71 
Incentive Fee (%) 367 15.25 20.00 1929 17.49 20.00 -2.24 0.00** 
High Water Mark 367 0.69 1.00 1929 0.82 1.00 -0.13 0.00** 
Lockup Period 367 4.00 0.00 1929 4.43 0.00 -0.43 0.21 
NOTE: This table reports cross-sectional means, medians and the difference in means of descriptive 
statistics for both “Problem” and “Non-Problem” funds in our population of hedge funds filing Form ADV. 
“Problem” funds are any TASS fund whose management company answered “Yes” to any of the questions 
on Item 11 of Form ADV. “Non-Problem” funds are all other TASS funds that filed Form ADV. Panel A 
reports results for performance statistics. Avg Return, Std Dev, 1st Order Auto Corr, Sharpe Ratio are the 
average return of the fund, the standard deviation, the first order autocorrelation, Sharpe Ratio of the fund 
over its life.  
 
Table 1 examines the performance differences and fund characteristics between 
problem and non-problem funds. There is no significant difference in terms of standard 
deviation or autocorrelation of returns. Problem funds are older than non-problem funds, 
indicating that it is more likely for a fund to encounter a problem over a longer time 
horizon.  The mean return, Sharpe Ratio, incentive fee level, and the percentage of using 
high water mark are significantly lower for problem funds, indicating problem funds may 
have a lower institutional quality. 
 Defining Operational Risk. Legal and regulatory compliance issues provide a 
simple – and measurable – proxy for operational risk more broadly defined to include  
personnel problems, investment process, internal control, portfolio pricing, or compliance 
issues. On this basis we define legal and regulatory “problem funds” as those that have 
high operational risk while “non-problem funds” are those that have low operational risk. 
This definition is of course necessarily incomplete. Some of the legal and regulatory 
problems identified in the ADV forms may not be related to operational issues. 
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Furthermore, there may be funds with operational issues that have not yet attracted the 
attention of legal or regulatory authorities. Nevertheless,  our analysis later in the paper 
shows that this definition is directly related to the current conflict of interest settings, 
ownership, and leverage ratios. 
Operational Risk and the ADV Variables. Table 2 examines the relationship 
between conflict of interest variables and legal or regulatory problems. Panel A of Table 
2 focuses on external relationships that represent potential conflicts of interest.15 It 
reports the frequencies of positive answers to questions such as whether the manager has 
a related broker/dealer, investment company, investment adviser, commodities broker, 
bank, or insurance company. The frequency with which problem funds answered yes to 
these questions is universally higher than for non-problem funds. For example, while 
73.9% of problem funds have a related Investment Adviser, only 41.6% of non-problem 
funds have the same issue. A similar dispersion exists for whether the firm has a related 
investment company—50.3% versus 15.8% for problem and non-problem funds, 
respectively. Note all the differences are significant at the 1% level. 
Panel B focuses on internal potential conflicts of interest. The variable 
AgencyCrossTrans for example, asks whether a broker-dealer buys and sells broker 
clients’ securities to advisory clients16. Only 2.3% of non-problem funds have this 
potential conflict of interest while over 30% of problem funds do. Problem vs. non-
problem funds also differ significantly in the proportion of positive responses to the 
question of whether the firm recommends securities to clients in which a related party has 
some ownership interest (RecSecYouOwn),with 25% more problem funds exhibiting this 
conflict. As in Panel B, all of the differences between problem and non-problem funds 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. One particularly troubling statistic is that 84.8 
percent of problem funds allow their personnel to buy and sell securities owned by the 
fund (BuySellYourselfClients).This is a rather direct conflict and is not acceptable 
                                                            
15 There is a high correlation between all of the conflict of interest variables. 
16 These and later terms refer to checkboxes on Form ADV. For complete definitions of these terms and 
explanations see the SEC website http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv.pdf 
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behavior in any public funds.17 Both Panels A and B illustrate a strong relationship 
between legal and regulatory problems and various measures of internal and external 
conflicts of interest. OtherResearch for example is a conflict variable in that it represents 
services obtained from a broker-dealer that the fund uses for its transactions. It is strongly 
significant. It suggests that the potential for conflicts of interest can lead to operational 
risk events, as measured by legal and regulatory problems.18  This may be due to an 
higher incidence of fraudulent activity by managers of problem funds, or alternatively, it 
may be due to the fact that the simple presence of apparent conflicts of interest attracts 
more regulatory scrutiny and litigation. Again, all the differences are significant at the 
1% level. 
Panel C examines the ownership and capital structure differences between the two 
groups. Problem funds have a higher number of direct and controlling owners.19 
Interestingly, the number of direct owners in the form of non-individual domestic entities 
(DirectDomestic) is higher for problem funds than it is for non-problem funds. This 
implies that problem firms are more likely to be structured as a venture or partnership 
with another institution. It also has the effect of allowing owners to hide their names from 
the ownership list, although it does not exempt them from reporting. Finally, the 75% 
ownership variable, which is the percentage of owners who own 75% of the company, is 
larger for problem funds. Theoretical results suggest that fear of expropriation—one 
source of operational risk—will make the management more concentrated rather than less 
concentrated. These results are confirmed in our data and all the differences are highly 
significant.  
An important insight revealed in Panel C is the fact that problem funds are less 
able to raise leverage than non-problem funds. This issue is examined in depth in, Brown, 
Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz (2007) who argue that operational risk issues make 
prime brokers and lenders less willing to provide leverage and to provide less leverage. 
                                                            
17 It is also striking that 69.3 percent of non problem funds also allow their personnel to trade fund 
securities on their own account. While significantly lower than the problem funds, it suggests that some of 
the “non problem” funds are “problem funds” in waiting. 
18 It is important to note that many jurisdictions prevent public funds engaging in soft dollar transactions 
because of this appearance of conflict. 
19 The definition of a controlling owner is set by the SEC. This is not a flag set by the company itself. 
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While financial risk is often associated with a high degree of leverage, it seems that the 
inability to raise leverage capital is itself a signal of serious operational issues uncovered 
in the due diligence conducted by potential lenders. 
Given that an affirmative answer on Item 11 could reflect anything from 
involvement in a civil suit to conviction of a felony, it is useful to examine whether the 
type of offense makes a difference. Are the differences between problem and non-
problem funds driven by one specific type of violation? To address this question, we 
classify the responses on Item 11 into four sub-groups. Group 1 includes managers who 
have been charged or convicted of a felony or a finance-related misdemeanor. Group 2 
includes managers who have had their rights to trade revoked at some time in the past. 
Group 3 includes managers with some form of regulatory violation, including a 
falsification or fabrication. Group 4 includes managers involved in a civil suit. These 
classifications are non-exclusionary; one manager may show up in all four categories. For 
the sake of brevity, the results of this analysis are not presented, however they clearly 
indicate that the differences between problem and non-problem funds are not driven by a 
single category of violation. 
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Table 2: Operational Risk and the ADV Variables 
Panel A: External Conflicting Relationships 
 “Problem” Funds  “Non-Problem”    
With: N % Yes N % Yes Diff p-
Broker/Dealer 368 73.1 1929 23.7 49.4 0.00** 
Investment Comp 368 50.3 1929 15.8 34.5 0.00** 
Investment Adviser 368 73.9 1929 41.6 32.3 0.00** 
Commodities Broker 368 53.5 1929 20.7 32.8 0.00** 
Bank 368 40.5 1929 9.8 30.7 0.00** 
Insurance 368 39.9 1929 8.3 31.6 0.00** 
Sponsor of LLP 368 56.8 1929 21.5 35.3 0.00** 
Panel B: Internal Conflicts 
 “Problem” Funds  “Non-Problem”    
 N % Yes N % Yes Diff p-
BuySellYourOwn 368 30.7 1929 8.3 22.4 0.00** 
BuySellYourselfClie 368 84.8 1929 69.3 15.5 0.00** 
RecSecYouOwn 368 75.5 1929 50.4 25.1 0.00** 
AgencyCrossTrans 368 30.7 1929 2.3 28.4 0.00** 
RecUnderwriter 368 69.0 1929 47.0 22.0 0.00** 
RecSalesInterest 368 22.6 1929 15.7 6.9 0.00** 
RecBrokers 368 46.7 1929 38.0 8.7 0.00** 
OtherResearch 368 81.0 1929 70.5 10.5 0.00** 
Panel C: Ownership/Capital Structure 
 “Problem” Funds  “Non-Problem” Funds    
 N Mean Median N MeanMedian Diff p-value 
Direct Owners 368 9.96 9.00 1929 7.33 6.00 2.63 0.00**
Controlling 368 8.28 7.00 1929 5.97 5.00 2.31 0.00**
75% ownership  366 0.73 1.00 1929 0.50 0.50 0.23 0.00**
Domestic Direct Corp 368 0.80 1.00 1929 0.49 0.00 0.31 0.00**
Indirect Owners 368 2.33 1.00 1929 1.37 0.00 0.96 0.00**
Leveraged 367 0.51 1.00 1929 0.57 1.00 -0.06 0.03* 
Margin 280 0.35 0.00 1451 0.49 0.00 -0.14 0.00**
Personal Capital 109 1.26 0.00 622 2.62 0.00 -1.36 0.02* 
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NOTE: Panel A reports results for external conflicts of interest, while Panel B breaks down internal conflict 
data. Broker/Dealer is 1 if the fund has a related broker/dealer. Investment Comp is 1 if the fund has a 
related investment company. Investment Adviser, Commodities Broker, Bank, Insurance and Sponsor of 
LLP are 1 if the fund is related to one of these companies respectively. BuySellYourOwn is 1 if the 
company buys and sells between itself and clients. BuySellYourselfClients is 1 if a related party buys and 
sells securities also recommended to the fund. RecSecYouOwn is 1 if the fund recommends securities in 
which a related party has an ownership interest. AgencyCrossTrans is 1 if the fund performs agency cross 
transactions. RecUnderwriter is 1 if a related party recommends securities to clients for which they are the 
underwriter. RecSalesInterest is 1 if a related party recommends securities with a sales interest. 
OtherResearch is 1 if the fund uses external research. Panels C looks at fund/manager characteristics and 
governance/ownership variables, respectively. High Water Mark, Leveraged and Margin are 1 if the fund 
has a high water mark, uses leverage or uses margin. Direct Owners represents the number of direct 
owners. Controlling is the number of controlling owners. 75% ownership is the percentage of owners who 
own at least 75% of the fund. Domestic Direct Corp gives the number of domestic corporations listed as 
direct owners. Indirect Owners represents the number of indirect owners.  
**, * Significant at 1 and 5 percent respectively 
 
Estimating an Operational Risk Measure. The above analysis shows the 
potential to construct quantitative proxies for operational risk. Funds with more conflict 
of interest issues, concentrated ownership, and low leverage ratios tend to have higher 
past operational risk, suggesting that such risks may also extend to future behavior.   The 
challenge for the analyst is how to construct a quantitative proxy for funds that did not 
file such forms.  In this paper, we describe a way to use more widely accessible data to 
construct operational risk scores. 
We use the ADV results to build an observable proxy for operational risk based 
on the widely available Lipper-TASS data. We use canonical correlation analysis, a 
statistical tool, to construct an instrument. The instrument weights observable TASS 
variables, such as size, age and fee structure in such a way that the resulting variable is 
maximally correlated to a variable similarly constructed from weighted set of the 
potentially unobserved ADV variables like conflicts of interest and ownership structure. 
This weighting structure has the additional advantage of being computable for time 
periods earlier and later than 2006.20  
The canonical correlation analysis proceeds as follows. We first identify TASS 
variables that prior research has shown to be associated with the probability of fund 
                                                            
20 This canonical correlation procedure was first proposed by Hotelling (1936). A good textbook treatment 
can be found in Press (1972). For another finance application, see Brown et al. (2002). 
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failure. We then estimate a linear combination of these variables that maximally correlate 
with a similarly maximally correlated linear combination of the cross-section of Form 
ADV disclosures in February 2006 that match the TASS sample. This linear combination 
using the TASS variables is our univariate proxy for operational risk, or ω-Score.21 
Finally, we use this linear combination to proxy for unobserved Form ADV information 
in the years prior to February 2006 using a time-series of TASS fund characteristics. 
 Table 3: Canonical Correlation Analysis of TASS and ADV Data 
TASS Variables  ADV Variables   
Previous Returns -0.27** AgencyCrossTrans 0.06* 
Previous Std. Dev. -0.35** RelBrokerDealer 0.28** 
Fund Age -0.07** RelInvestComp 0.24** 
Log of Assets 0.13** RelInvAdviser 0.24** 
Reports Assets 0.12** RelCommod 0.44** 
Incentive Fee -0.88** RelBank 0.38** 
Margin -0.29** RelInsur 0.44** 
Audited -0.19** RelPartSponser 0.30** 
Personal Capital -0.29** BuySellYourOwn 0.08* 
Onshore -0.05** BuySellYourselfClient -0.08** 
Open to Inv. 0.08 RecSecYouOwn 0.33** 
Accepts Managed -0.13** RecUnderwriter 0.26** 
  RecSalesInterest 0.28** 
  RecBrokers -0.33** 
  OtherResearch -0.70** 
Correlation Between   75% ownership  0.15** 
 TASS and ADV Panels 0.42** DirectDomestic 0.31** 
NOTE: This table reports the results of a canonical analysis relating operational risk ADV data to the 
observable TASS data. Panel A reported the results of the canonical analysis using 2,279 matched funds used 
to construct a univariate measure of operational risk, or ω-Score, using the linear combination implied by the 
TASS canonical variate. In Panel B we report regression results regressing annual fund return from 1994 to 
2005 on the ω-Score updated each year using information in that year’s TASS database on the basis of nine 
successive annual TASS datasets. Previous Returns are the average monthly returns from the previous year 
and Previous Std. Dev. is the monthly standard deviation from the previous year. Age and Size are the values 
from the end of the previous period. Other characteristic data are from the same period as the analysis. 
Reports Assets is a binary variable with a value of one if the fund reports assets and zero if it does not. 
Unreported style dummies and market betas were included in Panel B. The average number of observations 
is the average number of funds included in each year’s cross section regression of fund returns against 
operational risk characteristic and style. Panel C shows the extent to which this measure of operational risk 
predicts leverage. The dependent variable in each regression is the average leverage of each fund as reported 
by TASS. The independent variable is that year’s operational risk ω-Score. Unreported style dummies, as 
defined by TASS, and style dummies using the Brown-Goetzmann style classification procedure are 
included to control for style differences. 
                                                            
21 Altman (1968) creates a related z-Score model to study credit scoring. 
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 Table 3 reports the results of the canonical correlation analysis. Average monthly 
returns from the previous year, monthly standard deviation from the previous year, size at 
the beginning of the period, fund age and whether or not the fund reports assets are 
included in the analysis, as they have been previously related to fund death (Liang, 2000; 
Brown, Goetzmann & Park, 2001). The reported asset variable is a dummy variable with 
a value of one if the fund reports assets and zero if it does not. Other characteristic data 
from TASS, which relate to fund quality, are also included. 
 The maximal correlation between a linear combination of the TASS variables and 
a linear combination of Form ADV variables is 0.42 and is significant at the one percent 
level.  The Form ADV variable loadings are almost all positively correlated with the 
canonical variable, indicating that a higher value has more operational risk. For example, 
a higher percentage of conflict of interest issues and higher ownership is related to higher 
operational risk. Higher return, standard deviation and incentive fee are all negatively 
correlated with the TASS canonical variable, indicating these are negatively related to 
operational risk.  
 Backtest: From 1994 to 2005, we compute the ω-Score each year using the raw 
coefficients from our original analysis on the matched sample.22 We then regress fund 
returns on this operational risk ω-Score and include unreported style dummies to control 
for style differences.23 We also control for market risk by estimating market betas for all 
funds each year and include the unreported betas in the yearly cross-sectional regressions. 
We use Brown and Goetzmann (2003) cluster-based style dummies. We begin in 1994 as 
TASS began keeping defunct funds in their dataset that year. Table 4 reports the results 
of this analysis. 
                                                            
22 Instead of assuming the TASS characteristic data were static over time, we utilize nine different TASS 
datasets over a period of nine years (1998-2006) to use the most accurate characteristic data related to each 
fund at each time period. We use returns from the most recent TASS dataset however, as they are the most 
complete and accurate. To control for backfill bias, we remove the first 18 months of returns for each fund. 
Since we don’t have the fund characteristic data from 1994-1997, we used 1998 for calculating the scores 
for these years. 
 
23Alternative specifications of the canonical analysis were performed, including adjusted returns. These 
alternative specifications did not change the relationship between operational risk and returns. 
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Table 4: Operational Risk Measure Predicting Returns 
 B-G Style Dummies 
Year coefficient t-value  
1994 -2.28% -2.20* 
1995 0.10% 0.12 
1996 -3.27% -4.76** 
1997 -2.61% -3.71** 
1998 0.42% 0.60 
1999 -0.13% -0.14 
2000 -0.18% -0.25 
2001 -0.42% -0.95 
2002 -1.48% -4.43** 
2003 -0.41% -1.12 
2004 -0.67% -2.45* 
2005 -0.11% -1.31 
Average Value -0.92% -2.66* 
Average. Adjusted R-squared 40.17%  
Average Number of 1,027   
  **, * Significant at 1 and 5%, respectively 
 Over the entire twelve-year history, we observe a negative ω-Score coefficient. 
The ω-Score is significant at the 5% level. Hence, operational risk is negatively related to 
fund returns. Of the twelve years, the operational risk variable is negatively related to 
returns in ten years. Note 1998 was an extremely difficult year for hedge funds due to the 
Russian debt crisis and the near collapse of the LTCM. 1998 is also a year of great 
attrition of hedge funds, which would eliminate ex-post some of the riskiest funds in the 
sample—a selection bias that is known to induce a spurious ex-post cross-sectional 
relationship between risk and return (see (Fung and Hsieh (2002, 2000), and Liang 
(2000)). 
 Using the ω-Score Out-of-Sample to Predict Hedge Fund Failures. Our 
previous results indicate that the ω-Score performed reasonably well in-sample at 
differentiating relative performance. Next, we want to see if this score predicts out-of-
sample fund failure. We use the Cox Proportional Hazards model (1972) to predict the 
time to failure or survival time for a fund. The Cox Proportional Hazards model is the 
simplest and most common model used to model time to failure. It is most often used in a 
medical context to predict time to death given a certain medical treatment. 
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 The core of this survival analysis is to model the hazard rate, ( ).i tλ ( )i tλ  specifies 
the instantaneous rate of failure of fund i at time T=t, conditional upon the fund’s survival 
up to time t. More specifically, it is defined as follows: 
   
0
( |( ) limi t
P t T t t T tt
t
λ +Δ →
)≤ < + Δ ≥= Δ                               (1)    
 In the Cox model, a vector of fund characteristics is introduced to explain the 
hazard rate. The components of this vector are called “covariates”. 
    0( ; ) ( )
T
iz
i it z t e
βλ λ=                                            (2)    
where zT denotes the transpose of the vector z and 0 ( )tλ is the base-line hazard rate. The 
vector β is a set of the regression coefficients and assumed to be the same for all funds. 
To estimate Cox (1972, 1975) introduced the partial likelihood function, which 
eliminates the unknown baseline haza 0 ( )trd λ  and accounts for censored survival 
times.24  
he risk measure. The higher the standard 
ore, the regression 
results from the Cox Proportional Hazard model are as the following: 
                                                           
 Brown, Goetzmann and Park (2001) use the Cox model to analyze hedge fund 
failure. They find that performance, risk and fund age play important roles in the fund 
termination. They use standard deviation as t
deviation, the higher the hazard rate of a fund. 
 In our paper, we are interested in the prognosis of the survival of the fund (as 
measured by the time to liquidation) based on the fund’s ω-Score and its current age. On 
the basis of the June 2007 TASS database and the computed ω-Sc
 
24 See Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) for details. 
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Table 5: Regression results based on the Cox Proportional Hazards model 
 N ω-Score Chi-sq  age Chi-sq  
Convertible 491 0.04685 0.30  -0.00036 -0.15  
Dedicated Short 85 0.80538 2.73 ** 0.00583 1.34  
Emerging Markets 778 0.33043 4.23 ** -0.00513 -2.07 * 
Equity Market 649 -0.07736 -0.99  -0.00690 -3.23 ** 
Event Driven 1196 0.16691 1.76  -0.00739 -4.79 **
Fixed Income 493 0.36735 2.36 * -0.01668 -4.03 **
Fund of Funds 2281 0.08577 1.36  -0.00729 -5.45 **
Global Macro 506 0.16105 1.45  -0.00440 -1.75  
Long/short Equity 3936 0.16229 3.33 ** -0.00746 -7.86 **
Managed Futures 1046 0.19395 2.77 ** -0.00803 -6.66 **
All (ex FOF) 9180 0.17825 6.39 ** -0.00672 -11.91 **
NOTE: The ω-Score is calculated from 1999 and onwards. 
 In this table, the coefficients give the increased risk of failure for a given unit 
increase in the ω-Score or age. The problem with this analysis is that the hedge fund 
industry is immature and many young funds have not died yet. This problem is referred to 
as “right censoring” and is accounted for in the analysis. 
 We see that the risk of failure significantly increases with the ω-Score and 
decreases with fund age across the TASS funds through the time period of our analysis. 
For all funds excluding fund of funds, both the ω-Score and fund age are significant at 
the 1% level. 
 Across all investment styles, the effect is reasonably similar across style 
categories. The ω-Score is significant for styles like dedicated short bias, emerging 
markets, fixed income securities, long/short equity, and managed futures, implying that 
operational risk is important to explain fund failures in these categories. However, the 
coefficients are insignificant for styles such as convertible arbitrage, equity market 
neutral, event driven, fund of funds, and global macro. For these styles, financial risk or 
other types of risk may be important co-factors of failure in these funds. For example, for 
fund of funds, the operational risk is minimized after all the necessary due diligence 
process has been performed by fund of fund managers; hence operational risk is not the 
major source for the failure of funds of funds. One of the interesting features of the 
analysis is that one can compute a projected half life based on the current age and ω-
Score. Since a priori we have no clear theory which explains the time series behavior of 
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the hazard rate or the interaction between age and ω-Score, we considered the results for 
the entire sample allowing for both strategy and year dummies, as well as all possible ω-
Score interactions. Across all funds, the higher the ω-Score the smaller the half life of the 
fund, as indicated by Figure 1.25 
 




The ω-Score scale on the X axis corresponds to the 95% confidence interval from the empirical 
distribution of this quantity. The dark red zone, associated with young age and high ω-
Score is where one does not want to be, as the fund half life is less than six years. 
Effectively, a high ω-Score (high operational risk) predicts a shorter fund life in the 
future. 
                                                            
25 The half life may be overestimated given some of the funds have not been failed yet. 
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 Conclusion 
 In this paper, we build an operational risk measure, the ω-Score, for hedge funds. 
This ω-Score is related to the SEC filing information (Form ADV) such as the conflict of 
interest issues, leverage, and ownership. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, a lower 
leverage is corresponding to higher operational risk as it reflects that low quality 
managers may not be able to attract enough outside funding. Further, we correlate the 
ADV variables with the readily available TASS variables in order to build an observable 
proxy for operational risk. The final ω-Score based on the TASS data is able predict fund 
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